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REVIEW ESSAY
GENDER IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
LAWYER'S PERSONA
FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION'S WORK: THE RISE OF WOMEN'S
POLITICAL CI.LTURE, 1830-1900. By Kathryn Kish Sklar.* New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press. 1995. Pp. xviii, 436. $40.00 (cloth), $20.00
(paper).
SUSAN D. CARLE**
I. INTRODUCTION
The overarching question motivating this Review Essay is whether-
and, if so, in what ways-we should understand lawyering roles to be gen-
dered. I examine this question by reviewing Kathryn Kish Sklar's recent
biography of Florence Kelley, an early "public interest" lawyer and social
activist whom Felix Frankfurter described as the woman who had "the
largest single share in shaping the social history of the United States
during the first thirty years of this century."1 Sklar's meticulous research
provides us with new information about a dimension of Kelley's life that
is overshadowed by Kelley's public persona as a social reformer who
claimed special "feminine" moral insights: behind the scenes, Kelley op-
erated as a shrewd and enormously proficient trained and licensed law-
* Distinguished Professor of History, State University of New York, Binghamton.
* Assistant Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. This
Review Essay stems from a larger project investigating the construction of lawyering roles
within nonprofit organizations during the Progressive Era, initial funding for which was
provided through the W.M. Keck Foundation and the Georgetown University Law Center.
Additional generous funding was provided by American University, Washington College of
Law, whose research funds allowed me to benefit from the research assistance of Johnna
Dumler, Robin Evans, Cathryn Flanagan, and Sue-Jean Kim. I would also like to thank
Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Kathryn Kish Sklar, and my wonderful colleagues, Peter Cic-
chino, Nancy Polikoff, Leti Volpp, and Joan Williams, for helpful comments on earlier
drafts.
I LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER 8 (1984) (citing JOSEPHINE GOLD-
MARK, IMPATIENT CRUSADER V (1953)).
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yer.2 This Essay examines how Sklar's study of Kelley's life shows the
interplay of gender and claims to lawyering authority. I suggest that cer-
tain of the methodologies Sklar uses in analyzing the effect of gender on
Kelley's life should be imported by feminists in the legal academy to
redirect their inquiry into the operation of gender in the legal profession.
Questions concerning gender and lawyering roles have proved hugely
controversial. Gender infuses so much of social organization that it is
implausible to maintain that gender has no influence on the way lawyers
perform their roles; however, attempts to develop theories about how
lawyering is gendered have met with immense opposition. Similar doubts
have been raised about attempts to investigate the gendered underpin-
nings of the professional socialization of lawyers in law schools and be-
yond.'
Of the great many voices that have joined this debate, just a few can be
briefly summarized by way of introduction here. The pioneer and most
stalwart defender of the controversial view that lawyering is gendered is
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, who deserves great credit for having forced the
question of gender in lawyering into feminist legal discourse. Menkel-
Meadow has described her position as follows:
Drawing on the work of the affiliational or relational feminist theo-
rists, like [Carol] Gilligan ... and others, I speculated that women
who reason with ethics of care and concern, as well as justice, and
who took account of relationships and context rather than searching
for abstract principles to solve legal problems might structure the
legal system and legal practice in different ways.4
As Menkel-Meadow explains above, her hypotheses about the possible
relationship between gender and lawyering roles have been heavily influ-
enced by the research of Carol Gilligan and other feminists working
2 One prominent male lawyer with whom Kelley worked closely claimed that her "law-
yer's training" gave her a "disciplined and penetrating mind," which rendered her aihong
"intellectually the greatest" women of her times. Newton D. Baker, Address at Memorial
Service for Florence Kelley (Papers of Newton Baker, Reel 23, Frame 641, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.).
3 Compare LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997), with Linda Chavez, Would-Be Women Lawyers Need to
Quit Looking for Excuses and Get with the Program, CHI. TrB., Apr. 16, 1997, at 23, and
Chris Klein, New Studies: Female Students Do Just as Well as Men-Or Better, NAT'L LJ.,
Sept. 22, 1997, at A20.
4 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal
Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 289, 312-13
(1989) [hereinafter Theories of Gender]; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Dif-
ferent Voice, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) [hereinafter Portia I] (considering im-
plications for the legal profession of social psychology data revealing differences in male
and female styles of moral reasoning); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, 2 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 75 (1994) [hereinafter Portia 11] (reassessing earlier article in light of
decade's further insights).
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within the "object relations" school of American psychology.5 Gilligan's
work, as I discuss in more detail below, posits that female subjects tend
to place more emphasis on a "care" versus a "justice" approach to moral
problem solving. Menkel-Meadow has extrapolated from this hypothesis
to argue that gender differences in approaches to moral reasoning may
result in differences in lawyering styles-suggesting, for example, that
women may tend to be more "relational" than men or to work harder than
men at being conciliators and creative problem solvers rather than
gladiators in an adversarial system. 6
Menkel-Meadow may have been the first, but she is far from the only,
legal academic to advance such claims about the relationship between
gender and lawyering roles. Some sociologists of law have drawn on
Gilligan's work to support the thesis that women generally perform and
experience work as legal professionals differently from men.7 In a similar
vein, constitutional law scholar Suzanna Sherry has suggested that
women tend to exhibit a uniquely "feminine jurisprudence," character-
ized by a greater concern with connection and context, and that this dif-
ferent style of reasoning can be detected in the opinions of Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor.s Sherry concludes that
recognition of Justice O'Connor's unique perspective,, and the
unique perspective of women in general, might aid us in ameliorat-
ing the distortions of an overly individualist liberal paradigm. Insuf-
ficient attention to connection promotes naked self-interest at the
expense of altruism, impoverishes our self-perception, and stunts
5 This school traces its roots back to Freud and views the early attachments of the infant
and young child within the family as the most significant influences on personality. See
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DE-
VELOPMENT (2d ed. 1993); see generally NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF
MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978); DOROTHY DIN-
NERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN
MALAISE (1976); JULIET MITCHELL, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM (1974); KAREN
HORNEY, FEMININE PSYCHOLOGY (Harold Kelman ed., 1973 ed.).
6 See Menkel-Meadow, Theories of Gender, supra note 4, at 312-13, 316.
7 See, e.g., Dana Crowley Jack & Rand Jack, Women Lawyers: Archetype and Alterna-
tives, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 933 (1989) (applying Gilligan's framework to women law-
yers); see also Kathleen E. Hull & Robert L. Nelson, Gender Inequality in Law: Problems
of Structure and Agency in Recent Studies of Gender in Anglo-American Legal Professions,
23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 681 (1998) (reviewing recent additions to this literature).
Other sociologists, including Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, have disputed the existence of any
firm empirical foundation for conclusions that women experience or approach law practice
differently from men. See, e.g., Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Faulty Framework: Consequences
of the Difference Model for Women in the Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 309 (1990) (re-
porting on empirical findings establishing no clear correlation between gender and law-
yering approaches).
8 Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72
VA. L. REv. 543 (1986).
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our capacity for growth. Merely communicating a feminine empha-
sis on connection may be enlightening .... 9
Other leading feminist scholars, such as Naomi Cahn, have taken issue
with the arguments of Menkel-Meadow and others, but have proposed
their own variants of the thesis that certain positive qualities attributed to
women can form the basis of a distinctive approach to lawyering.1° Cahn
has called on feminist legal scholars to "transcend the difficulties of dif-
ference and move towards a feminist lawyering process, rather than a
feminine lawyering process."'" Still other scholars of the lawyering proc-
ess have called for the adoption of an "ethic of care" modeled after the
female voice Gilligan attributes to women and girls in her studies."
On the other side of the debate, leading feminist legal theoreticians
such as Joan Williams and Margaret Radin have strongly dissented from
arguments for change within the legal profession based on purported dif-
ferences between the lawyering styles of men and women. These com-
mentators caution that the use of any generalizations about gender-linked
lawyering approaches, even positive ones, risks creating stereotypes that
will do great harm to women's attempts to advance in the legal profes-
sion.13
In short, examination of the relationship between gender and lawyering
roles has become mired in disagreement about the usefulness of social
psychology perspectives.' 4 With some notable exceptions,"5 the study of
9Id. at 615.
10See Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1992); cf. Ann
Shalleck, The Feminist Transformation of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1071 (1992) (ar-
guing that the search for shared understandings of how gender operates in the lawyering
process should begin with the examination of one's own particular lawyering experiences).
1 Cahn, supra note 10, at 1042.
2 See, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Pro-
fessional Responsibility, 43 HASTINos L.J. 1175 (1992); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of
Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEo. L.J. 2665 (1993); Paul J. Zwier & Ann B. Hamric,
The Ethics of Care and Reimagining the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 22 J. CONTnrIP. L.
383 (1996).
13 See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 797 (1989) (ar-
guing against embrace of "stereotypes" about how women's personalities differ from
men's on grounds that these marginalize women); Margaret Jane Radin, Reply: Please Be
Careful With Cultural Feminism, 45 STAN. L. Rv. 1567 (1993).
14 In turn, the dispute just summarized is woven into a much larger debate about "differ-
ence" in feminist theory generally. The history and complexity of this debate defies any
attempt at quick summary; for some classic contributions, compare Robin West, Jurispru-
dence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988) (arguing that women have a sense of
connectedness to others based on their experience as mothers), with Williams, supra note
13 (arguing against any such generalizations). More recent theoretical work has sought to
move beyond this "differences" debate. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist
Theory In Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992) (proposing
the concept of "gendered lives"). However, such movement does not yet appear to have
taken place with respect to the study of gender and lawyering.
'- The-most notable of these exceptions is Virginia Drachman's research on the handful
of women who practiced as lawyers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, recently pub-
[Vol. 22
1999) Gender in the Construction of the Lawyer's Persona 243
gender and lawyering has languished in this unproductive theoretical im-
passe.
This Review Essay argues for a new approach that would borrow its
methodologies from feminist scholars working in disciplines other than
social psychology. Specifically, I point to the insights achieved by a group of
feminist historians, sociologists, and political scientists who have been
investigating the gendered construction of American social welfare pol-
icy. 6 Scholars working within this school, including Linda Gordon,
Kathryn Kish Sklar, and Theda Skocpol, have convincingly documented
the connections between the gender ideologies of the Victorian Era, the
women's social reform culture of the first decades of this century, and the
eventual structure and unique nature (and, one might also argue, special
vulnerability) of our New Deal welfare state.1 7 Through meticulous at-
tention to detail and to the paradoxes and surprises that emerge from a
fine-grained focus on their subject, these scholars have succeeded in
tracing how new generations of women received, transmitted, and trans-
formed ideas from previous generations and used those ideas in fashion-
ing new roles by which they could insert themselves into the realms of
civil society, politics, and policy.
This Essay argues that a similar focus by legal academics investigating
the effect of gender in the construction of lawyering roles could produce
enormous payoffs in understanding the transmission and transformation
of gendered ideas about how professional roles should be performed.
This approach would substitute a painstaking examination of the opera-
tion of gender in specific historical and social contexts for sweeping
brushstrokes of theory and generalization. Appreciating that our ideas
about the nature of observed differences between men and women are
loaded with historically and culturally contingent understandings, the
approach I advocate would stop debating the "truth" of such perceptions,
lished as a book. See VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN
MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY (1998), on which this Essay will rely extensively; see also
Barbara Allen Babcock, Feminist Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1689 (1998) (book review).
16This is sometimes described as "matemalist" history, but there are differences between
these historians in the emphasis they place on maternalist ideologies in explaining the
power of women's reform movements in the Progressive Era. See Kathryn Kish Sklar, Two
Political Cultures in the Progressive Era: The National Consumers' League and the
American Association for Labor Legislation, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN'S HISTORY: NEW
FEMINIST ESSAYS 36, 41-42 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds., 1995) (discussing some of these
differences).
1
7 A number of the classic articles in this genre are compiled. See MOTHERS OF A NEW
WORLD (Seth Koven & Sonya Michel eds., 1993); WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE
(Linda Gordon ed., 1990). A sampling of other influential work from a variety of discipli-
nary perspectives includes THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992); Linda K. Kerber,
Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place: The Rhetoric of Women's History, 75 J.
AM. HIST. 9 (1988); Ann Shola Orloff, Gender in Early U.S. Social Policy, 3 J. POL'Y.
HIST. 249 (1991); and ROBYN MUNCY, CREATING A FEMALE DOMINION IN AMERICAN
REFORM: 1890-1935 (1991).
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and would instead treat all such observations as data reflecting socially
constructed ideas.18 This approach would avoid the false dichotomy be-
tween an outright denial that gender operates in constructing lawyering
roles and an analysis focusing on women's "differences" as lawyers. In-
stead, this approach would acknowledge gender as a powerful force in
creating social roles, but would search for its influence in the context-
specific negotiations women-and men-have engaged in to reconcile
their gendered identities with lawyering norms.
My approach would further search for the routes through which gen-
der-linked ideas about professional roles are transmitted to and trans-
formed by successive generations. The approach I advocate would thus
investigate how women have used, modified, and resisted gender-related
ideas in legal careers as a continuing, historically contingent process. I
focus especially on the difference between what individuals claim to be
doing with reference to gender ideologies and what they actually do-a
difference far too often ignored in discussions about how gender ideolo-
gies motivate behavior within the legal profession and elsewhere.
To illustrate my suggestions, I focus on one recent contribution to the
growing body of historical literature on the role of women's culture in
shaping American social policy which may be of special interest to
scholars of the legal profession: Kathryn Kish Sklar's biography entitled
Florence Kelley and the Nation's Work. Sklar's book constitutes the first
volume of her long-term biographical project 19 on Florence Kelley, who
served as head of the National Consumers' League ("NCL") from 1908
until 1932, and led this organization in its many famous battles for pro-
tective labor legislation that paved the way for the New Deal.
Sklar's biography makes obvious the great effect Kelley's legal train-
ing had on her work as a social reformer. Sklar's research thus reveals
(often incidentally, because exploring Kelley's identity as a lawyer is not
one of Sklar's main objectives) much about how gendered conceptions of
lawyering roles were negotiated during the early part of the twentieth
century, as well as how these negotiations affected the shape, strategies,
and results of the women's social reform movement of this same era.
The first volume of Sklar's biography ends just prior to Kelley assum-
ing leadership of the NCL, the organization that would provide Kelley
18 See generally JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 28-67
(1988).
19 Sklar's involvement in the writing of Kelley's life has spanned decades, resulting not
only in this first volume of a biography but also in a series of earlier publications related to
Kelley and the NCL. See, e.g., NOTES OF SIXTY YEARS: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF FLOR-
ENCE KELLEY (Kathryn Kish Sklar ed., 1986) [hereinafter, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES];
Kathryn Kish Sklar, Coming to Terms with Florence Kelley: The Tales of a Reluctant Biog-
rapher 17-33, in THE CHALLENGE OF FEMINIST BIOGRAPHY: WRITING THE LIVES OF
MODERN AMERICAN WOMEN (Sara Alpern et al. eds., 1992) (describing special tortures of
undertaking a biographical project as ambitious as this one) [hereinafter WRITING
WOMEN'S LIVES].
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with the platform from which to exert her profound influence on the
shape of United States social policy. The outlines of Kelley's career at
the NCL are well known, however, and with further archival research of
my own provide ample material to fill out and assess the story of Kel-
ley's life as a whole.
The centerpiece of that story concerns Kelley's involvement in over-
seeing the legal work for which the NCL is remembered today, including
her supervision of the female assistants who drafted the famous but mis-
named "Brandeis" brief in Muller v. Oregon20 and a host of other cases.
The documentary evidence reveals that Kelley played a key role in plan-
ning and overseeing the legal work of the NCL on many other fronts as
well. But despite the major role she played in overseeing the NCL's legal
strategy, Kelley avoided claiming the identity of "lawyer," preferring to
hide her legal handiwork under the imprimatur of leading male attorneys.
Kelley's choices in this regard reveal the interplay of powerful social
forces related to gender in the construction of a particular type of elite
public-interest lawyering role.
This Essay seeks to explore such forces and to relate them to current
questions about how gender operates within the legal profession. In Part
II, I provide an overview of Sklar's research on the first half of Kelley's
life, supplemented with my own research in progress on Kelley's later
life as the director of the NCL. Focusing on the question of Kelley's
agency, I explore Sklar's analysis of how gender affected Kelley's life
path, presenting both limits and opportunities. In Part Ill, I elaborate on a
question to which I argue Sklar pays too little attention, namely, how
Kelley's training and skills as a lawyer interacted with her gender in
shaping her public persona. I further suggest that some of the factors that
shaped Kelley's relationship to law still operate in shaping the "gendered
lives" 21 women lead as lawyers today. Thus, I suggest, even though large
gains have been made in women's opportunities as lawyers, Kelley's ex-
ample may help illuminate the ways in which gender continues to affect
the performance of lawyering roles today.
A clarifying note is in order here: the question of how gender affects
lawyering can be asked on several levels. First, gender can determine
who gets to perform what work, what one might call "ascription." Sec-
ond, gender can influence how work is performed, the level of analysis I
am intending to capture when I use the term "role." Finally, gender can
influence how work performances are judged, through the operation of
"norms." Even though ascriptive barriers based on gender are largely a
thing of the past in the legal profession, the empirical data show links
between gender and lawyering roles and norms (as reflected in gender-
2 208 U.S. 412 (1908). That Kelley's lieutenant, Josephine Goldmark, is the true author
of the Brandeis brief has been long recognized by feminist legal historians.
21 On the concept of gendered lives, see Fineman, supra note 14.
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linked differentials in advancement and status within the profession, for
example). My argument is that these data mandate a continued focus on
the many complex ways in which gender operates in the legal profession.
In Part IV, I offer some more specific preliminary thoughts on how the
historical and context-specific examination I am urging could advance
the legal academy's appreciation for the operation of gender in the con-
struction of lawyering roles.
II. THE STORY OF FLORENCE KELLEY
A. Beginnings and Transitions
Sklar begins her biography by tracing the influences that contributed to
Kelley's development of an acute social conscience during her childhood
and early adult years. One of these influences was Kelley's maternal great-
aunt, Sarah Pugh, a leading Quaker abolitionist and advocate of women's
suffrage.22 Through her examination of Kelley's relationship with this
aunt, Sklar brilliantly traces the links between the oppositional women's
political culture in which Sarah Pugh was involved, based in the
antebellum abolitionist and women's suffrage movements, and the devel-
opment of the women's political culture of the Progressive Era many
decades later. Sklar thus demonstrates how a "women's culture" can be
transmitted from generation to generation, through specific relationships
and role models. The high-powered lens Sklar focuses on Kelley's early
life-finely tuned and sensitive to specific social and historical con-
texts-thus captures the gendered transmission of ideas while avoiding
the tendency towards essentialism that sometimes mars such inquiries.
Sklar documents, for example, how Sarah Pugh greatly impressed
Kelley by refusing to take sugar in her coffee and wearing only linen be-
cause sugar and cotton came from slave labor. These ideas, Sklar argues,
foreshadowed the consumer boycott strategies with which Kelley and the
NCL would later experiment. Pugh was a close friend of Lucrieta Mott
and other leading social reform figures of her time, and Kelley grew up
surrounded by the influence of these visionaries' thoughts. In Kelley's
words, "moving through a child's imagination were Free Soilers and Revo-
lutionary ancestors, Quakers and Abolitionists and Non-Conformists, family
figures who had put their consciences to the test both of endurance and ac-
tion." 24
22 KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION'S WORK: THE RISE OF
WOMEN'S POLITICAL CULTURE 4 (1995). Citations to the book being reviewed will here-
after be given in the notes by page number only. See also AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES,
supra note 19, at 29-40.
23AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 19, at 38.
24 GOLDMARK, supra note 1, at 10. Kelley's early life had its dark side as well. Though
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In short, through her close relationship with her great-aunt, Kelley
benefited from the experiences of politically active women two genera-
tions before herself. The example set by Sarah Pugh and her associates,
Sklar suggests, gave Kelley a model for voluntary civic activism that
guided her later leadership of the NCL.5
The other strong influence in Kelley's childhood on which Sklar fo-
cuses is Kelley's father, William Kelley, a lawyer, state judge, and power-
ful U.S. Congressman. Sklar details William Kelley's political involve-
ment in the public issues of the day, which included not only abolition-
ism but also industrial development and trade.26 William Kelley was de-
voted to his young daughter and actively sought to instill in her a knowl-
edge of public affairs and an acute social conscience.27 Kelley later at-
tributed "everything that [she had] ever been able to learn to do"2 to her
father's efforts to educate her about the political affairs in Congress, and
she "cherished his charge that it was for his generation to create the great
industry and for ours to devise methods of just distribution of its prod-
ucts.
'29
In 1876, Kelley applied to and was granted admission at Cornell Uni-
versity, a land-grant college established in 1865 through legislation her
father had helped to enact.30 These land-grant colleges were required to
be "open for all," and they, along with elite eastern women's colleges
such as Smith and Wellesley, first opened avenues of higher education to
substantial numbers of white middle-class women in the United States.
At Cornell, Kelley entered a period of great intellectual activity. Sur-
rounded by other serious and intellectually gifted young women, Kelley
born to affluence, Kelley's childhood and early adult years were plagued by disease and
the threat of illness and death. Her mother, Caroline, lost five of her eight children to infant
diseases and was often consumed with melancholy as a result, and Kelley was allowed to
attend school for only a few short stints during her childhood because of her parents' fears
for her health. Kelley thus spent her childhood in virtual isolation from her peers, educated
through self-guided reading from her father's extensive library, with direction from loving
adults surrounding her. Pp. 27-35.
2 See AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 19, at 4, 13-18, 26.
2 See id. at 25-49.
27 Even teaching Kelley to read presented William Kelley with opportunities for indoctri-
nation. As Kelley reported:
Father had taught me to read when I was seven years old, in a terrible little book
with woodcuts of children no older than myself, balancing with their arms heavy
loads of wet clay on their heads, in the brickyards in England .... When my mother
and grandmother remonstrated with him for darkening the mind of a young child
with such dismal ideas, he replied seriously that life can never be right for all the
children until the cherished boys and girls are taught to know the facts in the lives of
their less fortunate contemporaries.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 19, at 26.
2 GOLDMARK, supra note 1, at 6.29 AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 19, at 62.
3 0See GOLDMARK, supra note 1, at 11.
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joined reading groups and helped found the first Cornell Social Science
Club."' Serious illness forced Kelley to withdraw from Cornell for her
senior year, however, and Kelley returned to her father's care in Wash-
ington, D.C. There, she wrote her senior thesis, titled "On Some Changes
in the Legal Status of the Child Since Blackstone," researched largely at
the Library of Congress. Devoting long hours to a painstaking analysis of
classic legal authorities, U.S. statutes on children's legal status, and sta-
tistical data on children's health and economic status, Kelley's thesis
combined legal research with empirical inquiry, presaging, Sklar sug-
gests, the style of legal research for which the NCL's protective labor
briefs would later acquire renown.
After graduating from Cornell in 1882, Kelley encountered the gap be-
tween rising expectations created by newly opened opportunities in higher
education for white middle-class women and barriers that remained to
block these women's entry into traditional professions such as law. Sklar
graphically documents this reality as it affected Kelley and her class-
mates. Most of Kelley's classmates entered teaching, some at women's
colleges after obtaining advanced degrees. 32 A handful became doctors or
dentists.33 But among Kelley's cohorts there were "no lawyers" (except,
eventually, Kelley herself)Y3
Kelley did not escape this plight. Applying for admission to the clas-
sics department at the University of Pennsylvania, whose dean was a
distant relative of hers, Kelley hoped to study advanced Greek as a means
of gaining entry to the University's law school.35 Kelley's ambitions were
thwarted by the University's general policy of refusing to admit women,
however; she was disappointed to find herself denied admittance even
after her father intervened on her behalf 36
As did many of the women of Kelley's generation caught in this gap
between educational qualifications and access to the professions, Kelley
chose to pour her frustrated energies into the thriving middle-class
women's social reform movement taking place around her.37 Kelley be-
31 See AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 19, at 49.
32 See p. 67.
33 See id.
3 See id. This is not to say that there were no women lawyers during this period. There
were some: approximately 200 in 1880. See RONALD CHESTER, UNEQUAL ACCESS: WOMlEN
LAWYERS IN A CHANGING AMERICA 8 (1985). A fascinating account of the correspondence
between a group of these early pioneers can be found in DRACHMAN, supra note 15, at 64-
97; see also Virginia Drachman, Women Lawyers and the Quest for Professional Identity in
Late Nineteenth Century America, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2414 (1990).
3 See AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 19, at 54.
3 See pp. 66-67; GOLDMARK, supra note 1, at 13. Elite law schools strongly resisted and
were hostile towards the admission of women. See DRACHMAN, supra note 15, at 41-51.
37 A burgeoning literature investigates the influence of these women's reform movements
on United States law. See, e.g., Jane E. Larson, "Even a Worm Will Turn at Last": Rape
Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J. L. & HUMIAN. 1 (1997) (docu-
menting legislative reform activities of the Women's Christian Temperance Union).
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came active in a number of women's voluntary associations in Philadel-
phia, taught evening classes for working girls and women, worked as a
librarian for a women's club, and found time to publish her first articles
melding social science research with a call for political activism on be-
half of working women.38
Kelley's opportunities for further education soon broadened, however,
after her father arranged for her to travel overseas as a companion and
nurse to her older brother, William, who was ill. (William recovered and
returned home to become a lawyer and politician in the mold of his fa-
ther.) Still in pursuit of the advanced degree in law that she coveted,
Kelley gained admittance to a government studies program at the Univer-
sity of Zurich and became one of a small group of women studying there.
Kelley soon joined a circle of young socialist political reformers and be-
came a passionate socialist herself, hearing in this political philosophy
the strains of the radical egalitarianism preached by her great-aunt Sarah
Pugh.39 Kelley remained a committed socialist throughout her life, de-
spite the political vulnerability this caused her in her work for social re-
form.
This period of Kelley's life also saw her disastrous marriage to a
young Russian socialist doctor. Summarized briefly, over the next eight
years, Kelley gave birth to three children and focused her energy on fam-
ily life (while still finding time to translate into English a major treatise
by Frederick Engels and to publish various political analyses in maga-
zines in the United States and Europe).4° Kelley's relationship with her
father deteriorated, partly as a result of the embarrassment she caused
him in embracing socialism and partly because she began to make in-
creasingly desperate demands on him for financial support for her family.
Facing the stress of economic hardship after her father severed relations
with her, Kelley's young family moved to New York City, where she and
her husband became active in the internal machinations of the Socialist
Labor Party until they were expelled over petty charges of having failed
to adhere to the correct party line.4 1 Kelley's relationship with her hus-
band deteriorated to the point of physical abuse, and in 1892 Kelley fled,
penniless, from New York City with her three children.
Although Kelley had by this time started to mend relations with her
family, she did not return to them. Instead, Kelley arrived at the doorstep
of Hull House, a social settlement in the heart of one of Chicago's poor-
est tenement districts. Kelley remained at Hull House for the next nine
years, developing the base within its community of like-minded women
38 See pp. 69-85.
39 See pp. 83-84; AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 19, at 74. Sklar has analyzed
Kelley's contributions to American socialism in an introduction to Kelley's autobiographi-
cal writings. See id. at 1-16.
40 See pp. 95-100.41See pp. 120-29.
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devoted to social reform. From that base, she would later launch her ca-
reer as one of the most important national reformers of the Progressive
Era.
B. Years at Hull House
Sklar's treatment of Kelley's years at Hull House focuses on how Kel-
ley's agency developed through her interaction with the women's reform
culture within which she situated herself. Because Sklar relies heavily on
the concept of agency throughout her narrative, but never explicitly ad-
dresses what she intends by this term, it is worth pausing to consider the
general theoretical work that has been done in this area.
The concept of agency has long been problematic in feminist theory.
Considerable recent work in critical and feminist theory has focused on
the question of how women or other oppressed people can be understood
to achieve creative, willful ends while at the same time being "consti-
tuted" and oppressed by their social worlds. That work has arrived at a
fairly clear consensus rejecting "strong" theories of agency based in lib-
eral political ideologies that posit the existence of transcendent, "free"
individuals who are somehow capable of rising above their life circum-
stances and patterns of socialization in achieving self-willed ends. 42 Less
agreement has been achieved about what conceptualization of agency
should take its place. Feminist theorists today appear to be spread across
a continuum of positions recognizing stronger or weaker versions of
"partial agency," that is, conceptions of agency within social constraints. 43
In her work, Sklar appears to endorse a fairly strong view of agency
conceived of in this way.44 Her conclusions arise from her analysis of the
42 See, e.g., James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Postmodern Subject in Legal The-
ory, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 489 (1991).
43 The key theoretical reformulation of the concept is Judith Butler's work proposing that
"agency[ ]' ... is to be located within the possibility of a variation [on repeated significa-
tions of gender] .... [I]t is only within the practices of repetitive signifying that a subver-
sion of identity becomes possible. The injunction to be a given gender produces necessary
failures, a variety of incoherent configurations... [and] the coexistence or convergence of
such discursive injunctions produces the possibility of a complex reconfiguration ...."
JUDITH P. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 145
(1990). For other work demonstrating feminists' agency in reconceptualizing the concept
of agency, see, for example, Joan Scott, Book Review, 15 SIGNS 848-60 (1990) (debating
proper understanding of women's agency in historical analysis); Kathryn Abrams, Sex
Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304
(1995) (contrasting agency critique with sexualized dominance paradigm in feminist the-
ory and arguing for a synthesized "partial agency" theory); Susan H. Williams, A Feminist
Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L.J. 417 (1997) (proposing new feminist theory of
"autonomy" developed through women's participation in constitutive communities); Kath-
ryn Abrams, Redefining Women's Agency: A Response to Professor Williams, 72 IND. L.J.
459 (1997).
44See also Sklar, supra note 16 (comparing capacity for agency of female and male so-
cial reformers working within different organizations).
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possibilities offered Kelley by virtue of her political base in a women's
community formed through networks of social reformers and settlement
house workers. Kelley obtained this springboard for her political agency
through her residency at Hull House. Founded in 1889 by Jane Addams
and Ellen Gates Starr, Hull House was one of the first social settlements
that emerged at the beginning of the Progressive Era in the northeastern
and midwestern cities of the United States. 5 These social settlements
were inspired partly by the progressive religious movement known as
Social Gospel, partly by the more charity-oriented social settlement
movement taking place in England, and partly by the growth in the class
of educated women without access to traditional professional careers
who wanted to work for social reform." Hull House was particularly
fortunate in being financially self-sufficient, funded by the considerable
personal fortunes of Jane Addams and several other women from wealthy
families.47 As Sklar convincingly argues, this rare financial independence
ensured that the character of Hull House could freely reflect the ideology
of its leadership. It also allowed the women residents of Hull House to
escape the economic necessity of marriage and develop new politically
conscious, reform-oriented professional commitments. 48
Thus, class, a positionality with respect to which Kelley was strongly
advantaged, was key to Kelley's agency. Sklar describes the class com-
monalities underlying the friendships Kelley formed with Hull House
leaders Jane Addams and Julia Lathrop. All three were daughters of
prominent politician fathers, came from upper-class families with strong
abolitionist principles, benefited from college education, and spent years
struggling to find occupations commensurate with their training.49 But
even more importantly, Sklar argues, all three shared a common com-
mitment to what they viewed as a uniquely feminine political vision for
social reform.
45See pp. 171-286; see also Kathryn Kish Skiar, Hull House in the 1890s: A Community
of Women Reformers, 10 SIGNS 658 (1985). On the social settlement movement generally,
see CLARKE A. CHAMBERS, SEEDTIME OF REFORM 107-29 (1963).
46 See generally ALLEN F. DAVIS, SPEARHEADS FOR REFORM: THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENTS
AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT: 1890-1914 (1967); MUNCY, supra note 17.
47 In its early years, the financial obligations of Hull House were shared between Ad-
dams and Ellen Gates Starr. In later years Addams's intimate companion, Mary Rozet
Smith, helped shoulder the financial burden of keeping Hull House going. P. 192. In one of
the many generous acts of personal kindness that allowed Kelley to keep her family intact,
Smith quietly funded the education of Kelley's three children. Pp. 286-90; see also Sklar,
supra note 45, at 660.43 Indeed, women involved in social settlements helped develop new professions aimed at
raising the fortunes of the working classes, such as social work and the new field of indus-
trial medicine invented by Hull House resident Alice Hamilton. See, e.g., Barbara Sicher-
man, Working It Out: Gender, Profession, and Reform in the Career of Alice Hamilton, in
GENDER, CLASS, RACE, AND REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 127 (Noralee Frankel &
Nancy S. Dye eds., 1991).
49 See Sklar, supra note 45, at 662-63; GOLDMARK, supra note 1, at 29-30.
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In this final emphasis Sklar introduces one of the most provocative as-
pects of her book. Sklar argues that Kelley's agency arose not only from
her class advantages, but also from her gender, an axis on which tradi-
tional feminist theory would posit she was unequivocally disadvantaged.
Sklar promises her readers that a chief aim of her book is to explore
the contours of the women's political culture that supported Kelley and
her peers.50 One of the few significant flaws of the book, however, is a
lack of extended discussion about how Kelley and her colleagues thought
about gender. Sklar gives us only limited data on this issue, but we can
fill in Sklar's picture by drawing on other scholarship about the "separate
spheres" ideology underlying the women's political culture at the turn of
the century and earlier.5'
That culture, as Sklar notes briefly, espoused a vision of women as
possessing certain qualities of "virtue" lacking in men. 52 Kelley and her
fellow women social reformers believed that they possessed special in-
sights into public policy by virtue of their "feminine" experiences, espe-
cially their traditional roles as nurturers (although, ironically, as we have
seen, most of these women achieved the freedom to devote themselves to
social reform by eschewing marriage and motherhood). These claims to a
special "feminine" knowledge deserving of attention from politicians
gained further legitimacy from women's electoral disenfranchisement:
women reformers could point to women's exclusion from the political
realm as a reason for the appalling disregard in public policy for the con-
ditions under which the poor lived and new generations of citizens were
being raised.5 3
Kelley and her peers thus claimed a special duty to attend to, and spe-
cial moral authority to speak about, social welfare policy reform. Hull
House became a testing ground for these beliefs, offering social services
such as schools, day care, and vocational training to members of the sur-
rounding impoverished communities, while also engaging in local politi-
cal activism aimed at reforming the conditions under which these indi-
viduals worked and lived.
Although Hull House was a female-dominated community, guided
strongly by the personality and values of Jane Addams, it was not a sepa-
50 See pp. xii-xv.
51 See, e.g., Paula Baker, The Domestication of Politics, 89 Aiu. HiST. REv. 620 (1984)
(discussing "separate spheres" ideology underlying turn-of-the-century women's political
culture); Estelle Freedman, Separatism as Strategy: Female Institution Building and
American Feminism, 1870-1930, 5 FEMINIST STUDIES 512 (1979) (same); MuNcY, supra
note 17 (same); Kerber, supra note 17 (same).52 See p. xiii.53 See, e.g., Florence Kelley, Persuasion or Responsibility?, 2 POL. EQUALITY SERIES np.
(n.d), on file at Schlesinger Library, Harvard University (arguing that social problems such
as illiteracy were worst where women had least power, that these problems would not oc-
cur if women could vote, and that women must in the meantime use "persuasion and pub-
licity as [a] means of gaining protection for the weaker classes in the community").
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ratist one. Most of its residents were unmarried women, but some single
men-typically clergy or men with strong religious motivations-lived at
Hull House as well. Hull House served as a lively social and cultural fo-
rum for Chicago's progressive elite, drawing to its dinner parties and
other social events many of the city's most notable intellectuals, includ-
ing University of Chicago professors and lawyers, such as Clarence Dar-
row and Henry Demarst Lloyd. Kelley would later call on many of these
contacts as political allies and consultants. Thus, Sklar argues, Hull
House offered not only a supportive female-dominated environment that
allowed women to escape the economic necessity of marriage and pursue
public lives devoted to social reform, but also provided a base from
which these women could interact with the male world of power and
privilege from a position of respect, independence, and strength.
Sklar describes how Kelley achieved stature as one of Chicago's lead-
ing social reformers through her location within this women's reform
culture (combined with her enormous personal talent and considerable
luck). Kelley first found work for herself at Hull House by founding a
labor bureau to train women to do domestic work for Chicago's upper-
class households. In 1892, Kelley secured, with Addams's help, a job
working for the Illinois Bureau of Social Statistics on a survey of indus-
trial working conditions in Chicago. That position led Kelley to addi-
tional appointments on other social surveys, in connection with which
Kelley wrote a detailed report describing the working conditions faced by
women and children in Chicago's sweatshops and making recommenda-
tions for remedial protective labor legislation. The publication of this
report coincided with the election in Illinois of a radical governor, John
Peter Altgeld, along with a progressive state legislature. Through this
turn of events Kelley's report became the basis for proposed legislation
to restrict the number of hours women and children could work in facto-
ries and to establish a state agency to monitor employers' compliance
with such mandates. Kelley's draft legislation was quickly enacted into
law, and in 1893 Kelley found herself appointed by Governor Altgeld to
the position of Chief Factory Inspector for Illinois. In this position, Kel-
ley directed a staff of twelve, including two lawyers who worked full-
time in prosecuting violations of the newly enacted maximum-hours law.
At around the same time that Kelley became Chief Factory Inspector,
she enrolled in night classes at the law school at Northwestern Univer-
sity. One of the most fascinating parts of Sklar's biography is its docu-
mentation of details concerning the little-explored facts about Kelley's
law training and brief period of legal practice. Kelley began attending
lectures at Northwestern in the evenings in 1893, and graduated with her
law degree the next year (having received credit for the reading in law
she had done with her father ifi 1882 and for her government studies in
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Zurich).5 4 Sklar's research shows that Kelley appeared in court to argue
several cases on behalf of her office prior to her law school graduation,
but that after she graduated, Kelley curiously delegated all the work of
appearing publicly as a lawyer to her male legal deputies.55
Sklar convincingly argues, however, that Kelley's strong intellectual
influence can be detected in the content and structure of the briefs these
male lawyers signed and submitted for Kelley's office. Sklar's detective
work thus captures the picture of Kelley directing the legal show behind
the scenes, while ceding the public role of lawyer to her male lieutenants.
Kelley continued to use this strategy throughout her career. Although
Sklar does not pursue the matter, Kelley's conduct-quite striking, to
contemporary eyes-provides telling clues about the operation of gen-
dered norms in the construction of the lawyer's persona, as will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in Part III.
It would, of course, be easy to jump to the conclusion that Kelley's
choice not to present herself publicly as a lawyer was simply a sign of
her oppression. But Sklar's portrayal of Kelley's agency presents a more
complicated picture. Sklar examines the "gendered construction of politi-
cal options" at the beginning of the Progressive Era and concludes that
Kelley was in some respects advantaged by virtue of her gender.5 6 To un-
dertake this examination, Sklar compares Kelley's political projects and
options with those of Kelley's close male friend and political associate-
also a lawyer-Henry Demarst Lloyd.57 Sklar arrives at the provocative
conclusion that Kelley was the more politically advantaged figure in her
specific social context.
Sklar describes the close similarities in Kelley's and Lloyd's political
commitments: both saw themselves as engaged in "a national struggle for
control of the social consequences of industrial growth;" both were
"wedded ... to labor's side of the industrial struggle[;]" and both con-
sidered "the state as the chief defender of civil, political, and economic
rights."5 8 But while Kelley flourished within the supportive environment
of Hull House, Lloyd's efforts to find a similarly comfortable institu-
tional affiliation met only with repeated frustration. Thus, Sklar con-
54 GOLDMARK, supra note 1, at 44.55Pp. 256-58.
56 Pp. 225-28, 276; see also Sklar, supra note 16.
5 Kelley's relationship with Lloyd had a further twist that bears mention. In a detail that
foreshadows the contradictions between Kelley's publicly espoused ideology and her pri-
vate self, we learn that Lloyd and his wife were the ones that provided Kelley with the
freedom to carry out her political work while raising three children, by agreeing to serve as
substitute guardians for her offspring. Lloyd's wife served as a second mother to Kelley's
children and allowed them to grow up in much the same privileged and nurturing sur-
roundings, complete with "unimagined experiences of country freedom and outdoor winter
play," that Kelley had enjoyed, while their mother tackled the gritty urban surroundings of
Hull House, reuniting with her children on weekends. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra
note 19, at 82.
5 p. 226.
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cludes, although the two friends' "political beliefs were very similar,"
they experienced "quite different opportunities to translate their ideas
into practical results. Kelley's relationship with women's public culture
carried her into direct action; Lloyd's relationship with men's public
culture muted his influence." 9
This example is one of several Sklar uses to illustrate that Kelley's ca-
pacity for agency was in many respects supported, rather than under-
mined, by the female public culture with which she was affiliated. Kelley
made use of the particular cultural, social, and ideological resources at
her command-including claims to a distinctive feminine vision-to
achieve agency in ways that some of her male counterparts could not.
This example, as I will argue in Part IV.B.2, belies claims that the social
attribution of gendered "voices" must always have negative consequences
for women. Sklar's work suggests that the picture is sometimes more
complicated and context-specific.
It cannot, however, be denied that Kelley faced great disadvantages be-
cause of her gender. Kelley's political position as a leading Chicago so-
cial reformer was far from secure. In a legal setback that would fore-
shadow Kelley's later frustrations with the legal system, her child-
protective legislation was struck down as unconstitutional. 60 Altgeld lost
his re-election bid soon afterwards, and in August 1897, Kelley found
herself unemployed. Kelley then tried, not for the first time, to gain an
appointment to the faculty at the University of Wisconsin, but was re-
buffed despite her accomplishments. Kelley was thus forced to turn to the
occupations open to women in her circumstances, taking a job as a li-
brary assistant and working long hours after the close of business to con-
tinue her social-science reports. 6 Kelley's network of political connec-
tions in the women's social reform community came to her rescue, how-
ever, and in January 1899, Kelley was offered the top staff position at the
newly founded National Consumers' League.
C. Kelley at the NCL
The first volume of Sklar's biography ends with Kelley leaving Hull
House for New York City to take up the challenge of serving as the Gen-
eral Secretary (executive director) of the NCL. Sklar's volume thus ends
right before the real action begins-before Kelley takes over the reins of
the organization through which she would earn her historical reputation.
The broad outlines of Kelley's later career at the NCL are far better
known than the early material Sklar has presented in the volume under
59 P. 228.
60 Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454 (Ill. 1895).61Pp. 286-98.
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review here, however. We thus need not wait for Sklar to complete her
ambitious biographical undertaking to evaluate the import of her research
to our central question concerning the gendered construction of lawyer-
ing roles.
The outlines of Kelley's work with the NCL are as follows: In 1899,
Kelley took over the running of the NCL. Kelley continued in this posi-
tion for the next thirty-two years, until shortly before her death in 1932.62
During this time, the NCL played a leading role in the enactment of more
than a dozen state laws providing for protective labor standards in indus-
try, most of them limited to women and children, but some also encom-
passing male workers where political conditions allowed. The NCL par-
ticipated in scores of appellate cases defending these statutes from con-
stitutional attack. It also played a large role in orchestrating legislation
that would serve as a harbinger of the New Deal, including the bill es-
tablishing a federal Children's Bureau in 1911, which would be staffed
by activists from the NCL and other women's reform groups, and the
federal Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Protection Act of 1923.
Structurally, the NCL was organized into regional chapters, most lo-
cated in the Northeast and Midwest.63 Never an organization with a mass
membership base, it achieved its political clout by virtue of the special
nature of its membership: primarily educated, upper-middle-class white
women married to some of the nation's most politically and socially
prominent men. Some men, many of them clergy, belonged to the NCL,
but most of the male involvement in the organization was in an advisory
capacity, as local legal counsel, strategic consultants, financial managers,
and the like.
In many respects, the philosophy and direction of the NCL combined
the female-oriented, consumer focus of Kelley's great-aunt Pugh with the
political savvy of Kelley's father.' 4 In its earliest years, the NCL focused
on fact-gathering and education campaigns aimed at persuading consum-
ers to patronize only those businesses that adhered to humane labor stan-
62 It also bears note that Kelley was unlike a great many other white social reformers of
her era in being a strong advocate of racial equality. Kelley lent her time and connections
to the NAACP as one of that organization's few active white board members, prompting
W.E.B. DuBois to deliver a moving eulogy for her when she died in 1932. See Benno C.
Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 444, 524 (1982) (describing Kelley's consultations with Brandeis on be-
half of the NAACP in developing the factual record of discrimination by railroads for pres-
entation to Interstate Commerce Commission); W.E.B. DuBois, Eulogy of Florence Kelley
at her Memorial Service (NAACP Papers, Folder 51, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.).63See generally Allis Rosenberg Wolfe, Women, Consumerism and the National Con-
sumers' League in the Progressive Era, 1900-1923, 16 LABOR HIST. 378 (1975).64 The organization's "thesis," in Florence Kelley's words, was "that the responsibility
for bad conditions rests largely with the consumers; that ignorance is no excuse; that si-
lence gives assent; that useful protest rests always upon carefully sifted facts; that trade
unions and philanthropic organizations can only supplement social legislation, not take its
place." Kelley, Thirty Years of the Consumers' League, SURVEy 210, 211 (Nov. 15, 1929).
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dards. One such initiative was a "White Label" campaign, through which
the NCL granted upscale women's undergarment manufacturers permis-
sion to sew NCL labels into their merchandise in return for their agree-
ment to subscribe to the NCL's standards for humane treatment of
women workers. Another was a campaign urging women consumers to
do their holiday shopping early, in order to protect the largely female
sales staff from rush conditions. 65 Committees of regional chapters also
kept themselves busy inspecting the health and sanitation of local food
establishments and monitoring state and local legislation on the NCL's
issues, especially child labor laws. 66
This type of voluntary consumerism work provided opportunities for
elite white women to become involved in work intended to improve the
plight of the less fortunate without shaking their basically conservative
political orientations. Over time, however, it became increasingly appar-
ent to Kelley that this focus could produce only limited returns: in the
White Label campaign alone, performing inspections to add manufactur-
ers to the NCL's "approved" list, monitoring subsequent compliance, and
stopping cheating by nonsubscribing manufacturers proved a monumen-
tal undertaking, yet addressed conditions in only a fraction of one small
manufacturing sector. Kelley, therefore, began to steer her organization-
sometimes against strong resistance by the more conservative members
of local chapters67-towards a greater focus on state and national legisla-
tion to establish and enforce mandatory labor standards in industry.
Here Kelley's considerable legal skills came into play. Kelley played a
lead role in choosing the cases in which the NCL would become in-
volved, negotiated with the states to allow the NCL's intervention,
planned and oversaw the development of the legal briefs drafted by her
female assistants at the NCL and recruited prominent male attorneys to
serve as the legal figureheads for these cases.
The most famous of these involvements by the NCL was Muller v.
Oregon, in which the NCL saved from constitutional challenge an Ore-
gon labor law that prescribed maximum hours of work for women in
6 For a detailed discussion of these activities of the NCL and the NCL's early focus on
inducing voluntary compliance by employers, see MAUD NATHAN, THE STORY OF AN Ep-
OCH-MAKUNG MOVEMENT xiii, 2-44, 60-78 (reprint 1986) (1926).
6 See, e.g., Papers of Massachusetts Consumers' League, Box 1, Folder 9 (Schlesinger
Library, Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Mass.).
67 For some examples of the friction within the NCL Kelley encountered as she steered
the organization in the direction of broader social reform, see NATHAN, supra note 65
(complaining about Kelley's too-progressive politics); Minutes of Executive Committee
(Feb. 16, 1918) (Massachusetts Consumers' League Papers, Box 1, Folder 10, supra note
65) (debate about suspension of White Label campaign); id. (Mar. 4, 1920) (Kelley urging
chapter to spend more time on federal matters); id. (Nov. 1, 1922) (vote not to send dele-
gate to annual meeting because of switch in focus away from local concerns); id. (Oct. 3,
1923) (committee plan to meet with Kelley to express dissatisfaction with national office
undertaking projects that require help from constituent leagues without the committee's
consent).
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laundry establishments. Much has been written criticizing the NCL's
substantive position in that brief, and I do not intend to add to that well-
developed literature here.6 What cannot pass without note in this Essay
is the fact, already well-recognized among feminist historical scholars,
that the famous "Brandeis" brief was drafted, not by Brandeis, but by
Josephine Goldmark, Kelley's research assistant.69 Brandeis' name, not
Goldmark's, appears on the cover of the brief, and Brandeis probably
wrote a short introduction, but Goldmark's work constitutes the entirety
of the brief, with very minimal, if any, editing.70 This working arrange-
ment once again manifested the curious relationship between male "law-
yer" figures and female "not-lawyers" that Kelley first established during
her tenure as Chief Factory Inspector in Illinois.
Over the next nine years, Goldmark and Brandeis engaged in similar
collaborations on a number of other briefs defending various states' pro-
tective labor legislation.71 In all of these cases, it was Goldmark who
gathered and synthesized the relevant social science data and drafted the
great bulk of these briefs, while Brandeis claimed principal authorship
and conducted oral argument in court.
72
In 1917, after Brandeis' appointment to the Supreme Court, Felix Frank-
furter assumed Brandeis' role as the NCL's chief legal figurehead, this time
receiving research and writing assistance from a new assistant to Kelley,
Molly Dewson. Dewson, representing the next generation of women who
's See, e.g., Anne Dailey, Favorite Case Symposium: Lochner for Women, 74 Tax. L.
REv. 1217 (1996) (disputing conventional view of Muller as inaugurating new Progressive
jurisprudence); Julie Novkov, Liberty, Protection, and Women's Work, 21 L. & Soc. IN-
QUIRY 857 (1996) (arguing that case law upholding protective labor legislation reflected
courts' conceptions of men's and women's liberty interests as differing); Mary Becker,
From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219, 1219-25
(1986) (pointing out examples of sex stereotyping in NCL's briefs).
69 General accounts of the working relationship between Brandeis and Goldmark in
Muller and other cases are presented in PHILIPPA STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR
THE PEOPLE 114-31 (1984). Goldmark was Brandeis's daughter-in-law and gives in her
biography of Kelley a first-hand account of the meeting in which Kelley and Brandeis
negotiated over the terms under which Brandeis agreed to participate in the Muller case.
See GOLDMARK, supra note 1, at 155.
70 This assertion can be confirmed by comparing Josephine Goldmark's draft of the brief,
contained in the NCL's files at the Library of Congress, with the final version filed by
Brandeis. Even Goldmark herself, who is excessively (and thus sometimes maddeningly)
modest in describing her own role within the NCL, admits as much. See GOLDMARK, supra
note 1, at 155-58.
71 Cases in which Goldmark and Brandeis worked together in this way include Miller v.
Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N.Y. 395 (1915)
(529-page "Summary of Facts of Knowledge"); People v. Elerding, 98 N.E. 982 (Ill. 1912);
Hawley v. Walker, 232 U.S. 718 (1914) (500-page summary of facts); and Bosley v:
McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915).
72Brandeis did, however, take the unusual step of listing Goldmark's name on the brief
beneath his, despite the fact that she was not a lawyer. See briefs in cases cited in note 71.
The literature on Brandeis, his lawyering style, and his numerous public interest in-
volvements is vast. A particularly thoughtful account is Clyde Spillenger's Elusive Advo-
cate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445 (1996) (critiquing
Brandeis's desire for lawyerly independence and detachment from his clients' interests).
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transmitted women's political culture into American social policy, would
go on to become Eleanor Roosevelt's close friend and a member of
Franklin Roosevelt's inner political circle, from which position she-
along with Francis Perkins and other NCL graduates-exerted a powerful
influence on New Deal politics. 73
Dewson and Frankfurter collaborated on three briefs in the Adkins
case,74 which sought to defend a statute establishing minimum-wage
protections for women workers in Washington, D.C. Dewson and Frank-
furter reportedly met in person for only one hour at the initial stage of
their project, but corresponded regularly. Frankfurter .enthusiastically
praised Dewson's talents to Kelley, apparently well-satisfied with her
legal work, which included drafting a final brief totaling 1,138 pages. 75
Despite this work, however, the NCL was devastated to lose the Adkins
case before the Supreme Court, which held, by a vote of 5 to 3 (with
Brandeis recused), that the challenged statute violated adult women's
rights to freedom of contract.
The Adkins catastrophe forced Kelley and the NCL to confront the
changing political climate that accompanied the end of the Progressive
Era. By 1923, women had won suffrage, as the Court pointed out in re-
jecting the NCL's claims that women required special legislative protec-
tion.76 The composition of the Court had also shifted, and a more conser-
vative political tenor sounded throughout the country. The NCL thus
faced the discouraging prospect that Adkins would precipitate the invali-
dation of all the protective labor statutes it had worked for decades to
enact and defend across the nation. 77 The critical question became what
steps to take in response. Here Kelley and her male legal consultants
clashed in a manner that exposed the vulnerability in Kelley's strategy of
relying on male lawyers as her public legal figureheads.
My own research provides further details about Kelley's struggle to
maintain control over legal strategy within the NCL. Consistent with the
direction in which her political vision had developed-which had started
73 Dewson's life is chronicled in SUSAN WARE, PARTNER AND I: MOLLY DEWSON, FEMI-
NISM, AND NEW DEAL POLITICS (1987). According to Ware, Dewson shared similar views
to Kelley's on the question of women's differences from men, believing that women shared
a stronger interest in social betterment and humanitarian justice, and that the "outstanding
feminine contribution is a sense of relatedness" as opposed to a "masculine grasp of facts."
Id. at 197; see also Susan Ware, Unlocking the Porter-Dewson Partnership: A Challenge
for the Feminist Biographer, in WRITING WOMEN'S LIvEs, supra note 20, at 51, 61-63.
14261 U.S. 525 (1923).
75 See WARE, PARTNER AND I supra note 73, at 98-99; Letter from Felix Frankfurter to
Florence Kelley, (Feb. 28, 1921) (Papers of Felix Frankfurter, Harvard Law School Ar-
chives microfilm, Reel 100) [hereinafter Frankfurter Papers] (Frankfurter describing Dew-
son as "imaginative," "understanding," and devoted and as displaying "real quality of in-
tellectual initiative and independence").
76 See 261 U.S. at 553.
n See HARLAN B. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 104 (1960) (describing ef-
fects of Adkins on state minimum-wage laws).
Harvard Women's Law Journal
by advocating local, voluntary consumer action and grew to see a need
for compulsory legislation on a state and then a national scale-Kelley
decided that the only feasible response to Adkins was a national cam-
paign for a constitutional amendment; an amendment would ensure that
future efforts to enact protective labor legislation could not be undone
with a stroke of the Court's pen. 7 Kelley's plan met with strong opposi-
tion, however, not only from Frankfurter but also from the NCL's other
close male attorney advisors, including Harvard Law School professor
Roscoe Pound, progressive New York City attorney Robert Szold, and
NCL President and former Secretary of War Newton Baker. Steeped in
the conservative culture of the American legal profession, these lawyers
saw Kelley's call for a constitutional amendment as far too radical, even
for a cause as important as the protection of the nation's workers. 79
When Kelley continued to insist on her campaign to change the Con-
stitution, and even presented language for the amendment she envisioned,
she pushed her male advisors beyond the limits of their legal traditions.t 0
78 Kelley's frustration was further fueled by the Supreme Court's decision striking down
federal legislation prohibiting products made with child labor from entering interstate
commerce. Kelley and other social reformers supported the idea of a constitutional
amendment on child labor. Frankfurter opposed this plan as well, on the ground that solu-
tions to such social problems belong at "the local level of government." LIvA BAKER,
FELIX FRANKFURTER 114-15 (1969).
,9 See generally MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND His TIMES: THE RE-
FORM YEARS 128, 162 (1982) (describing Frankfurter's increasing disillusionment with
national solutions to social problems in the aftermath of the First World War).
o See Sybil Lipschultz, Social Feminism and Legal Discourse: 1908-1923, 2 YALE J. L.
& FEMINISM 131 (1989) (observing growing divergence between men's legal and women's
reform cultures in 1920s). Although Lipschultz's basic point is certainly correct, I have
some quibbles with her analysis. Lipschultz claims that male lawyers saw "equality and
difference as binary opposites" and that they resisted the efforts of 1920s female reformers
to achieve "industrial equality" for women by abandoning their earlier Muller-type claims
about women's physical weakness and instead pointing to the differences in the social
conditions faced by women. Id. at 160. My research suggests that the dispute between
Kelley and her male legal advisors was more about tactics than about goals and that the
differences between the political views of female reformers and male attorneys were more
complex than Lipschultz suggests. Kelley, for example, continued to espouse Muller-like
views about women's greater physical weakness throughout her life. See, e.g., Letter from
Florence Kelley to Newton D. Baker (June 3, 1921) (Papers of National Consumers'
League, Reel 11, Frame 706, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) (describing visit
from Alice Paul and criticizing "these mad women" supporting the ERA, which would
invalidate legislation requiring employers to provide women with seats in the workplace
and "other special items which are more necessary for women than for men"); see also
infra note 93 (describing Kelley's "lifelong" views about women's differences). Moreover,
contrary to Lipschultz's claim that the NCL's male lawyers thought in "binary" terms
about equality/inequality and sameness/difference, these men ardently opposed Alice
Paul's formalist equality doctrines and agreed with Kelley's views opposing the Equal
Rights Amendment. See Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of Equality: The
Women's Minimum Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 1905-1923, 78 J. AM. HIST. 188 (1991) (describing the split during the 1920s
between Kelley and the National Women's Party). Frankfurter's views about the underly-
ing purposes of sex-specific protective labor legislation also seem much more in accord
with Kelley's social vision than Lipschultz understands. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Hours
of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 4 HARV. L. REv. 353, 367 (1916) (arguing
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Frankfurter ceased to act as a neutral legal advisor taking direction from
his client, and began instead to behave as an advocate for his own politi-
cal views. Kelley expressed great "impatience with further tinkering with
legislation" and invoked her father's struggle for passage of the Recon-
struction Amendments and the fight for women's suffrage as models of
the campaign she envisioned, but Frankfurter continued to insist that the
proper strategy was to redraft the D.C. statute to address the Court's ob-
jections.1 When Kelley refused to accept his advice, Frankfurter began to
use his stature to fight Kelley's proposal at NCL chapter meetings.
Frankfurter acknowledged to one male lawyer ally that Kelley "has given
her life to causes before you and I were born which at the end of her
whole life are largely dust and ashes," but nevertheless added, "[olf
course, that doesn't mean that we should allow her to run away with her
own ideas and subscribe to them if we don't believe them." s Frankfurter
further urged his fellow male legal consultants to "put on their fighting
armor""3 and boycott the conference Kelley had called to discuss what
steps should be taken next.
Kelley's falling out with Newton Baker was no less dramatic. Baker
started his career as a lawyer and progressive mayor of Cleveland, Ohio,
and later became Secretary of War under Woodrow Wilson.' In 1915, he
accepted the position of President of the NCL where he was Kelley's
strong supporter. Baker had used his appointment to a cabinet post during
World War I to the great advantage of Kelley and the NCL s5 and had
shown himself willing to defend Kelley against recurring attacks by NCL
members who disliked her socialist commitments. s6 But even Baker could
that jurists should "cease to look upon the regulation of women in industry as exceptional,
as the law's graciousness to a disabled class, and shift the emphasis from the fact that they
are women to the fact that it is industry and the relation of industry to the community that
is regulated").
s, Letter from Florence Kelley to Felix Frankfurter (May 26, 1923) (Frankfurter Papers,
Reel 100, Frame 280, supra note 75).
82 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Ben Cohen (June 5, 1923) (Frankfurter Papers, Reel
100, Frame 288, supra note 75); see also id., Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Grace Abbott
(June 5, 1923); Executive Committee Minutes (June 6, 1923) (Massachusetts Consumers'
League Papers, Box 1, Folder 11), supra note 66 (notes reflecting Frankfurter's attendance
at a Massachusetts Consumers' League meeting to speak against Kelley's proposal and
advocate his own plan to revise the D.C. statute); id. (June 22, 1923) (Kelley strongly op-
posing Frankfurter's proposed redraft of D.C. statute).
83Id.
m Baker's biographer characterizes him as a "gradualist" who was left-wing on local is-
sues and right of center on national ones. See C.H. CRAMER, NEWTON D. BAKER: A BIOG-
RAPHY 8 (1961). Somewhat ironically given his earlier involvement with the NCL, Baker
by the end of his life had evolved into an "open-minded conservative" who opposed the
augmentation of national authority under the New Deal. Id. at 8, 260-77.
I Baker, for example, agreed to require army clothing contractors to adhere to minimum-
wage scales, maximum work hours restrictions and the like; established a wartime Board
of Control for Labor Standards, to which he appointed Kelley; and exerted his influence to
oppose efforts to override, in the name of the war effort, state statutes prohibiting night
work for women. See CRAAIER, supra note 86, at 191.
6 See, e.g., Letter from Newton D. Baker to Maud Nathan (June 30, 1919) (Papers of
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not support Kelley when she argued that our "Ancient Instrument must
be amended." 87 Baker responded that the Constitution should never be
used to legislate and joined the boycott of Kelley's conference, which
would decide the next steps after the Adkins defeat. In the end, Kelley's
frustration rose to such a great level that she wrote an uncharacteristi-
cally blunt letter to Baker demanding his resignation.88
This conflict between Kelley and her male political advisors ended in a
stalemate. 9 But the split between Kelley and her male legal advisors
contributed to a decline in the NCL's momentum in the 1920s. Within
the organization, the NCL's governing board became deeply divided
about Kelley's efforts to enlist the NCL in an ultimately unsuccessful
plan to pass a constitutional amendment to override the Supreme Court's
veto of federal child labor legislation." Outside forces further contributed
to stalled social reform efforts as the women's rights movement split
between social reformers such as Kelley, who accepted sex-specific ap-
proaches to protective labor legislation, and the "equal rights" feminists
represented by the law-trained Alice Paul and the National Women's
Party, who argued for across-the-board formal equality.9' But although
National Consumers' League, Reel 8, Frame 127, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.);
letter from Maud Nathan to Newton D. Baker (June 28, 1919) (complaining about Kelley's
involvement in "socialist" organization).
87 Letter from Florence Kelley to Newton D. Baker (Nov. 28, 1919) (Papers of National
Consumers' League, Reel 7, Frame 653, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). For
more on Baker's view of the Constitution, see Newton D. Baker, The Making and Keeping
of the Constitution, Address Before the College of William and Mary, in BULLETIN, Dec.
10, 1934, at 8, 24 (arguing that the Constitution "deals with the structure of a government
and avoids mere legislative enactments" and urging students to avoid suggestions for con-
stitutional change "pressed on you [as] suggestions of convenience and social ameliora-
tion," because, without deep understanding of constitutional principles, "your judgments
will necessarily be infirm in the face of such appeals"). For insights into Baker's philoso-
phy on a wide range of matters, see WILLIS THORNTON, NEWTON D. BAKER AND His
BOOKS (1954).
88 Kelley began:
A long time ago, at your request, I promised to tell you frankly if it should appear
that the League needed a change in its top officer. The catastrophe of the adverse
decision of the Supreme Court in the minimum wage case caused confusion in our
ranks[,] which called for close intimate participation of the officers of the Councils
of the League. This you could not give ....
Letter from Florence Kelley to Newton D. Baker (Aug.29, 1923) (Papers of Newton Baker,
NCL File [1922-28] Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).
89 Kelley was too skilled a politician to allow her anger at Frankfurter and Baker to stand
in the way of her relationship with these key figures for long. She soon persuaded Baker to
continue his involvement with the NCL as an honorary president and continued to call on
Frankfurter for legal advice, most importantly, on the Equal Rights Amendment drafted by
Alice Paul, which Kelley and others in her reform circle ardently opposed because of the
threat it posed to many state laws that granted protective labor standards to women only.
See supra note 80.
90See GOLDMARK, supra note 1, at 117-19.91 See generally NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISAI 120-29 (1987)
(discussing the split between National Women's Party, represented by Paul, and women's
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Kelley could not know this at the time of her death in 1932, a new gen-
eration of NCL graduates, including Dewson, Grace Abbott, and Francis
Perkins, would transmit the'NCL's gendered vision of social policy into
the New Deal, thus continuing the influence of an American female po-
litical culture into another generation.92
III. THE MYSTERY AT THE HEART OF KELLEY'S STORY
The first volume of Sklar's biography does not foreshadow the conse-
quences that followed from the division between male public lawyering
roles and female behind-the-scenes legal worker roles, as just described;
it will be interesting to see what Sklar makes of these matters in the next
volume of her biography. But even in her first volume under review here,
Sklar leaves the reader puzzled by a mystery she never explicitly ad-
dresses: Why did Kelley choose not to assert her status as a lawyer in
defining her public persona? This question stands as a central narrative
knot-an unresolved tension at the heart of the plot that compels our in-
terest in Kelley's life.
There appears, as far as I have been able to glean, no direct evidence
that provides a conclusive answer to the question of why Kelley did not
publicly claim the identity of lawyer (though we can hope that Sklar will
uncover such evidence in the next volume of her biography). Kelley's
autobiographical writings provide few clues: Kelley discusses her early
interest and studies in the law and her motivations for eventually obtain-
ing her bar license, but not why she did not carry through on her initial
intent to practice law. And although Kelley's general views about
women's proper place in the home led her to appear "old-fashioned"
even to her near-contemporary admirers,93 Kelley did strongly support
women's legal training and admission to all privileges of the legal pro-
social reform groups such as the NCL, represented by Kelley); Zimmerman, supra note 80
(same). Paul was herself trained as a lawyer at American University's Washington College
of Law. See Mary L. Clark, The Founding of Washington College of Law: The First Law
School Established by Women for Women, 47 Am. U.L. REv. 613, 665 (1998). A poten-
tially fascinating project might explore how Paul's and Kelley's respective self-identities
in the legal realm contributed to their political differences.
92 See Wendy Sarvasy, Beyond the Difference versus Equality Policy Debate: Postsuf-
frage Feminism, Citizenship, and the Quest for a Feminist Welfare State, 17 SIGNs 329
(1992).
93As Kelley's friend and colleague Josephine Goldmark explained:
[Kelley's] deep-rooted feminism, her passionate championship of the rights of
women, her denunciation of wrongs still suffered by them were never in conflict
with her fundamental belief in the claims of the family. She was, in the intensity of
that belief, what might today be called old-fashioned.
GOLDMARK, supra note 1, at 18.
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fession.94 Like many people oriented towards action rather than self-
examination, Kelley appears simply not to have reflected on the contra-
dictions of her own life situation.
One of Sklar's many talents as an historian is her care in reasoning
from historical sources, and the lack of conclusive evidence about Kel-
ley's motives perhaps accounts for Sklar's failure to address why Kelley
chose not to embrace the role of lawyer. It is not difficult to surmise,
however, what factors motivated Kelley's decisions, based on what we
know about the social and historical context in which she was operating.
Kelley's decision to emphasize her "feminine" moral voice-her claim to
possess special knowledge derived from women's domestic experiences,
untainted by the amoral, masculine world of business and law-was per-
fectly rational given the options available to her. The number of women
lawyers in Kelley's age cohort was small, and although the number was
increasing, many of the women who had received law degrees by the
close of the nineteenth century had tried but failed at law practice. 9
Those who did practice law typically did so in the offices of their hus-
bands or fathers. 96 Thus, a claim by Kelley to have the qualifications to
exercise authority in the masculine legal culture of her day would have
subjected her to constant struggles against skepticism and discrimination.
On the other side of the balance, Kelley had little to gain from insisting
on recognition as a lawyer because she had much richer sources of per-
sonal capital on which to draw. Her personal capital came from two main
sources, as we have seen. First, Kelley enjoyed the advantages of class
privilege, having been raised in a socially prominent family and claiming
as her father a nationally powerful politician. Kelley profited from all of
the skills acquired from such an upbringing, as well as its advantages in
94Indeed, Kelley attributed the Supreme Court's decision in Adkins to the lack of
women's representation in law, writing:
In my own profession, the exclusion of women from the best equipped law schools
with greatest prestige is most injurious for it delays the needed membership in the
courts of women with every requisite qualification. The Supreme Court of the
United States has taught us, in recent years that, until this change is made, the most
defenseless of our people, women and children who must earn their living in indus-
try, need not hope for social justice.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 19, at 57.95 See generally DRACHMAN, supra note 15, at 2, 173; KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE
INVISIBLE BAR (1986); Virginia G. Drachman, The New Woman Lawyer and the Challenge
of Sexual Equality in Early Twentieth-Century America, 28 IND. L. REV. 227, 229-35(1995). Still other women ran into the roadblocks of discriminatory law school and/or bar
admissions policies and never even obtained their bar licenses. See D. Kelly Weisberg,
Barred from the Bar: Women and Legal Education in the United States 1870-1890, 28 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 485 (1977).
96 See, e.g., JANE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICA'S FIRST WOMAN LAWYER: THE BIOGRAPHY OF
MYRA BRADWELL (1993); Virginia G. Drachman, "My 'Partner' in Law and Life": Mar-
riage in the Lives of Women Lawyers in Late 19th- and Early 20th-Century America, 14
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 221, 230, 235-42 (1989).
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providing an extensive network of personal, family, and class connections
to circles of power and influence.
Second, Kelley drew personal and political capital from her ties (which
overlapped with class) within the women's social reform movement. As
we have seen, Kelley's claim to special moral expertise as a reform
movement leader was directly tied to a separate spheres ideology that
attributed special moral insights to those with a "feminine" experience.
For Kelley to have asserted credentials in the masculine world of law
may thus have contradicted, rather than enhanced, Kelley's authority.97
But as Sklar's biography and what we know of Kelley's later life make
clear, Kelley's public persona was greatly at odds with her actual con-
duct. While Kelley was willing to forego the status of "lawyer," she did
not want to secede from actual involvement in shaping the legal strategy
of the Illinois Factory Inspector's Office or the NCL. Kelley's instincts
appear to have correctly told her that retaining control over legal strategy
was crucial to her ability to lead these organizations, and she thus exer-
cised her legal expertise behind the scenes while cultivating men to serve
as the legal figureheads.
The existence of such contradictions-between fact and image, public
identity and private conduct, work performed and accomplishments
claimed-emerge as powerful evidence of the operation of gender in the
construction of lawyering roles in Kelley's historical context. These con-
tradictions and incoherences also, I suggest, following Judith Butler's
conception,98 created opportunities for agency. Kelley navigated within
the structures of gender, race, and class to achieve political and personal
power. I am, in short, convinced by Sklar's claims that gender in some
ways enhanced, even while it in other ways constrained, Kelley's politi-
cal agency.
Today, of course, women's opportunities in law have greatly increased.
The role of lawyer is no longer gendered in the same sense as it was
during Kelley's time; women can now comfortably claim the title of law-
yer and large numbers enter the profession. Much evidence, however, still
points to continuing gender differentiation in lawyering roles once past
the threshold. Women lawyers, for example, can still be observed in a
great many institutions engaging in role-differentiated behavior vis-a-vis
their male counterparts, much as Kelley and her female colleagues did-
as, for example, in being relegated to behind-the-scenes, supporting roles
to senior male figureheads who then claim the public credit and pres-
97 See DRACHMAN, supra note 15, at 9-36 (discussing attempts to reconcile separate
spheres ideology with women's entrance into the legal profession); id. at 65-77 (describing
women lawyers' experience of "double consciousness" in attempting to integrate gender
and professional identities); see also Babcock, supra note 15, at 1696 (noting that, unlike
in medicine, "there was no way to sugarcoat law practice by connecting it to the ideal
world of purity and tender feeling that nineteenth-century women supposedly inhabited").
93 See BUTLER, supra note 43.
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tige. 99 Similarly, statistics show that, with rare exceptions, women law-
yers continue to confront a "glass ceiling" that shuts them out from the
uppermost strata of the profession."U The legal roles men such as Bran-
deis and Frankfurter assumed in their day-as super-elite public figures
with enormous social capital and reputation-are still largely reserved
for men. 01 It thus cannot be denied that gender continues to have a sig-
nificant effect in shaping individuals' life trajectories in the legal profes-
sion, even in the absence of the obvious structural barriers presented by
exclusionary policies. I°2 It bears asking, then, whether aspects of Sklar's
methodology might help us understand the complicated ways in which
gender operates, both as an historical force and continuing into the pres-
ent, in the construction of lawyering roles.
IV. SOME THOUGHTS ON A RESEARCH AGENDA
Sklar's work illuminates a number of possibilities for a renewed re-
search agenda exploring the operation of gender in the legal profession.
This Part considers these issues and suggests some ways in which Sklar's
project may offer corrective insights in the debate among feminist legal
scholars about gender and lawyering roles.
A. Why Study Gender in the Construction of Lawyering Roles?
The most important overall lesson of Sklar's detailed inquiry into Flor-
ence Kelley's life is that a focus on gender in understanding the con-
9 See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: A Reaction, 65 FORDHAr
L. REv. 603, 605 (1996) (discussing tendency for women lawyers to be assigned underval-
ued "minding and grinding" roles).
100 Studies of this striking phenomenon hint at a host of causal factors, including, ac-
cording to one leading study: a lack of "mentoring" of women attorneys by more senior
figures; policies about part-time, flex-time and other work expectations that disadvantage
women who are playing traditionally gendered caretaking roles outside the workplace;
mixed messages about what "personal styles" are considered acceptable for women attor-
neys; and women's ambivalence and role confusion. See Committee on Women in the Pro-
fession, Report: Glass Ceilings and Open Doors, 64 FORDHAMt L. REV. 291 (1995).
101 See id. at 310, 358. Indeed, legal academia has proved to be one of the most resistant
bastions of gender stratification. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMXMISSION ON
WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: THE EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL
EDUCATION 23 (1996) (finding women hold only 16% of tenured faculty positions and
only 8% of deanships); Carl Tobias, Engendering Law Faculties, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1143 (1990). Other statistics attesting to the continuing gender stratification of the legal
profession abound. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminization of the Legal Profes-
sion: The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY 221 (R.
Abel & P. Lewis eds., 1995) (transnational study).
102 For a path-breaking analysis of the factors that give rise to such differentiated oppor-
tunities in the professions, see JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY WORK AND
FAMILY CONFLICT AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (forthcoming 1999).
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struction of professional roles is a worthwhile-even crucial-project.
Sklar carefully documents how deeply the constraints and possibilities
offered by gender affected Kelley's approach to being a lawyer and social
reformer. Sklar's work thus belies the claims of critics within the legal
academy who denounce as counterproductive a focus on gender differ-
ences in understanding lawyers' roles.
Moreover, as we have seen, Sklar's work brings into focus the specific
links by which one historically and socially situated women's culture
was transmitted, transformed, and employed to achieve important legal
and public policy objectives during the first part of this century. Sklar's
research illustrates the complicated means by which ideas about role per-
formance-how to be a good lawyer, or a good social reformer, or a good
anything-are passed down from generation to generation. Just as Kel-
ley's vision both resembled and differed from her great-aunt's and her
father's, any new generation, agent, or personality both inherits and
transforms what it has learned and observed. Gender is one such power-
ful social lesson, learned, thankfully, in partial and contradictory ways
that create space for resistance and transformation. Although we under-
stand very little about the processes by which this kind of
intergenerational transfer and transformation of role-bound behavior
takes place, 03 the powerful influence of history and social context cannot
be questioned, as Sklar's work tellingly illustrates. Sklar's work thus
suggests that additional careful inquiry could similarly reveal the tena-
cious ways in which gender-linked ideas about professional roles have
been transmitted to and informed the lives of successive generations of
lawyers.
B. Some Correctives Suggested by Sklar's Inquiry
1. The "Different Voice" Theorists
The most controversial claims about how gender operates in the con-
struction of lawyering norms are those based on the premise that women
assert or should assert a different type of moral "voice" as lawyers.'04
As already noted in Part I, support for this premise is generally drawn
from Carol Gilligan's book In A Different Voice, pointing out the conse-
quences of researchers' exclusion of women and girls from empirical
studies of human development of moral reasoning.105 Read carefully, Gil-
103 One interesting postmodemist-feminist perspective on the need for more work on
these questions can be found in SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF 217-18 (1992).104 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Portia I and Portia II, supra note 4.
105 See GILLIGAN, supra note 5. Significantly, both here and even more so in her later
work, GiUigan is careful to emphasize that her findings are not that girls and boys reason
differently. Rather, Gilligan finds that both males and females express "justice" and "care"
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ligan's work makes relatively modest claims. But some in the legal acad-
emy have extrapolated from Gilligan's work more ambitiously than her
actual data warrant, giving rise to a counter-reaction that has thrown the
whole project of inquiring into the gendered dimensions of lawyering
into disrepute.
Menkel-Meadow's work, which draws heavily from Gilligan, has
similarly become a lightening rod for criticism from those who oppose
"different voice" perspectives.'t 6 But just as in the case of Gilligan, a
careful reading of Menkel-Meadow's claims shows them to be far more
tentative than they are sometimes portrayed. Menkel-Meadow can be
read as offering a series of hypotheses, research questions, or brain-
storming exercises for further empirical inquiry into the ways in which
gender may assert itself in the legal profession.' °7 It may be true that the
entry of large numbers of women into the legal profession will (through
some complicated causal chain of events and influences, not explained)
lead to less greed, more altruism, the development of less adversarial
lawyering styles, less hierarchical management, more attention to quality
of life issues, and so on.10 To note such possibilities is not to argue that
they are necessary truths. Instead, these ideas require empirical verifica-
tion. Some such hypotheses may present workable research projects;
some must at this point remain speculative given the limits on the present
state of our knowledge and ability to acquire it. Sklar's work suggests
that we can neither reject the significance nor assume the accuracy of our
speculations about the possible links between gender and lawyering per-
formances until we understand much more about the complex processes
through which role socialization takes place.
Put otherwise, broad claims that there are gender "differences" in law-
yering performances or "voices" can be seen as provocative, exploratory
probes opening new areas for inquiry. What must follow is a closer, more
detailed investigation that will test, refine, discard, and/or validate parts
modes of reasoning, but that more girls (about half of them) exhibit a "predominance"
towards a care orientation. Gilligan's point is that researchers who limited their studies of
moral development to boys tended to overlook this important aspect of both female and
male moral development. See, e.g., MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN xix, 8, 82, 112 (Carol
Gilligan et al. eds., 1988). In her later work, Gilligan is somewhat more careful to ac-
knowledge class and cultural biases. See, e.g., id. at xix (limiting findings to "educationally
advantaged North Americans"); id. at 159-73 (finding, not surprisingly, that disadvantaged
urban youth display a greater focus on a 'justice" orientation, with all study subjects able
to describe deeply unfair situations they had experienced).
106 See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 10.
107 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Theories of Gender, supra note 4, at 296-97 ("feminist
theory has moved too fast for the research necessary to test some of its claims .... We still
need the thick descriptions of gender-structured reality .... We still require explicit test-
able hypotheses about gender differences to determine their validity"); Menkel-Meadow,
Portia I, supra note 4, at 50 ("It is my hope that this preliminary review will spark more
thorough and comprehensive research.").
,13 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Portia II, supra note 4, at 86-89, 108-114 (suggesting
these possibilities as result of influx of women into legal profession).
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(probably, even certainly, not all) of the claims that have been made
about how gender is linked to lawyering roles. Sklar's book offers an
excellent example of how such an inquiry might be conducted.
Sklar's work further demonstrates how a change of focus in studying
gender can result in a very different picture than that suggested by a pre-
liminary, wide-angle scan. Some of the conclusions that emerge from
Sklar's exhaustive inquiry are just as one might have anticipated, but
other aspects of Sklar's findings are at odds with what preliminary
speculations might predict. For example, one might assume a priori that
a separate spheres ideology, focused on women's special insights derived
from their domestic experiences, would have led women's reform groups
to concentrate on small-scale, local volunteerism, as indeed the NCL did
during its first years of existence. But as we have seen, the NCL's strat-
egy, with Florence Kelley as its driving force, evolved over time to envi-
sion sweeping social policy reform on a national scale, to the point of
calling for fundamental constitutional reforms. This vision was on such a
grand scale that even the generation of progressive male lawyers affili-
ated with the NCL, suffering from the myopia of legal traditionalism,
could not stretch their imaginations sufficiently to embrace it. In the
1930s, as already noted, this "feminine" vision of a national welfare state
would achieve partial fruition in the national social policies of the New
Deal. 109
This example demonstrates the fallacy of positing that a moral orienta-
tion attributed to a particular gender will necessarily translate into a par-
ticular substantive outcome. The intermediary links are too many, the
processes by which ideas are transmitted and transformed too complex,
to assume any particular result from traits attributed to a particular gen-
der in a given historical period or social context.
2. Critics of the "Different Voices" Approach
As just noted, Sklar's work highlights the problems inherent in attrib-
uting particular outcomes to the actions of a particular gender, even in a
context in which a strong ideology based on perceived gender differences
clearly is in play. Equally important, however, Sklar's work points out
the reductionist tendencies inherent in strong versions of opposing claims
that focusing on women's "different voices" (whether culturally or bio-
logically explained) necessarily results in the attribution of inferior
stereotypes to women.
First, it simply defies plausibility to deny that women lawyers engage
in multifaceted forms of self-presentation, both verbal and nonverbal,
that differ from those of male lawyers. Gender is a pervasive social fact
enforced at many levels, from "macro" structures to the "micro" details
109 See supra note 17 (citing examples of literature exploring this history).
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of everyday self-presentation, in which one unavoidably performs gender
regardless of whether one chooses to use traditional symbols of gender or
to reject them (thus making another powerful and immediately obvious
statement).110 The question thus is not whether gender operates in the
performance of lawyering roles but, instead, what the inevitable mani-
festations of a gendered identity-made consciously and unconsciously
in infinite ways over the course of one's lifetime-mean; what they sig-
nal, in connection with claims to authority within the realm of law.
Second, Sklar makes a convincing argument, in both the Kelley biog-
raphy and some of her prior work,"' that gender stereotypes do not nec-
essarily marginalize or empower members of either sex. Instead, gender
stereotypes provide a context that often burdens women with a set of dis-
advantages, but sometimes presents special avenues of opportunity for
resistance or transformation. In contrasting the options available to Kel-
ley with those available to her male friend and political cohort Henry
Demarst Lloyd, for example, Sklar shows the ways in which important
possibilities (even in "male" terms) are sometimes available to women
but not to men by virtue of gender arrangements.
To make this point is not to deny that women suffer great disadvantage
on the axis of gender. As we have seen, Kelley's strategy of acceding to
conventional expectations of role differentiation between male "lawyers"
and female "nonlawyers" significantly hurt her ability to lead the NCL
when her views differed from those of the male lawyers to whom she
ceded public authority over legal matters.
Similarly, one might argue that if Kelley had had access to the male
world of privilege-if she had been able to pursue her desire for law
training unimpeded, for example, as her brother did-she could have ac-
complished far more than she did given the more limited opportunities
available to her. But the fact remains that it is Kelley, not her brother,
whom we today remember as one of the most important social reformers
of her era. This point remains telling even if we adopt Brandeis or Frank-
furter as the correct standard for comparison: Kelley could not have been
who she was if she had access to the masculine political and legal power
possessed by Brandeis and Frankfurter. Kelley's historical importance
derives from her success in building a political base among women re-
formers through which to advance visionary ideas that defied the frame-
work espoused by a tradition-bound, male political and legal world. The
very fact of Kelley's exclusion from that world provided her with the
ideological and motivational bases underlying her life project.
Put otherwise, Kelley both gained and lost by relying on claims to a
special "feminine" voice; the complexity of this situation defies a neat
11 See ERVING GOFFMAN, GENDER ADVERTISEMENTS (1979) (analyzing gender coding in
myriad aspects of dress, body movement, and other aspects of self-presentation).
"I See Sklar, supra note 16.
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tally on a profit/loss ledger. Sklar's treatment of these complex problems
concerning Kelley's agency demonstrates how facts may prove more
complex and ambiguous than a univalent theory of male privilege can
acknowledge. Moreover, the example of Kelley's agency based in claims
to a special "feminine" moral authority contradicts arguments that "dif-
ferent voice" claims are always and necessarily counterproductive.
This last point, of course, skirts a giant epistemological debate about
whether the experience of membership in oppressed groups creates
unique forms of knowledge. 112 I do not intend to take on this debate
within the confines of this Review Essay; my intent here is to make a
more modest point, using Kelley as an example of how perceptions of
and claims to common experience can motivate agency and change in
enormously productive ways. We thus should not dismiss all such rhe-
torical strategies out of hand as some feminists in the legal academy have
tended to do on the subject of gender in the legal profession.
In sum, Kelley's example shows us that understanding the ways gender
operates in particular contexts may call for a more complex analysis than
a univalent theory of male domination permits. To argue that the exis-
tence of male domination (a social fact that appears present in all known
societies in one way or another 13) means that gender always and com-
pletely disadvantages women is to essentialize male privilege in much
the same way that adherents of "different voices" claims have been ac-
cused of essentializing historically and socially contingent expressions of
femininity. To echo a favorite point of Foucauldians, power is never so
absolute as to leave no room for challenge, maneuvering, or transforma-
tion. These areas of contestation present the most interesting material for
studying how gender and other ideologies operate in the construction of
our social world. To be open to such complex understandings may re-
quire more tentativeness, more open-mindedness, and more tolerance for
ambiguity on all sides in the debate about how gender operates in the
construction of lawyers' personas.
All of this is not to say that critics of the use of moral difference theory
in the study of the legal profession have not added some important cor-
rectives in this debate. First, of course, as already noted, these critics are
entirely correct in objecting to tendencies to resort to broad-brush, es-
sentialist claims about the nature of gender differences.11 4 Similarly, crit-
112 Compare, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness
Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1763 (1990), with Scott Brewer, Pragmatism, Oppression,
and the Flight to Substance, supra at 1753 (debating claims that oppressed groups have
special knowledge); see also Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102
HARV. L. REv. 1745 (1989) (disputing arguments that scholars of color may possess dis-
tinct and uniquely valuable perspectives on race issues).
,,3 See SHERRY B. ORTNER, MAKING GENDER: THE POLITICS AND EROTICS OF CULTURE
177 (1996).
114 The classic treatment of this issue is Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Femi-
nist Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990).
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ics of the "differences" view are on point, I believe, in cautioning against
making too much of the results of Gilligan-style social psychology to
draw conclusions about how men and women differ.15 As Sklar's work
so beautifully portrays, and as many commentators have pointed out,
gender differences vary widely with social context, historical period, per-
sonality, and a host of other factors, and our research methodologies must
be able to take all of these influences into account.
3. An Additional Corrective
Finally, Sklar's work suggests a lesson often forgotten by participants
in the debate about how to understand the operation of gender in the con-
struction of lawyering norms. That lesson is that the gender ideology in-
dividuals claim to espouse, based on certain social expectations or ideals,
may not correlate in any reliable way with how they actually behave.
Actual conduct may-indeed, probably will-deviate significantly from
such ideal representations. This possibility is one that Gilligan, for ex-
ample, seems to greatly under-appreciate in her work: the self-reports of
the girls in the studies on which many of the conclusions in In A Differ-
ent Voice are based may state that they approach moral problems in a
certain manner, but those claims do not resolve the question of how they
actually perform.
A similar idea is captured by the image of Shakespeare's Portia, who
so captivated early theorists who applied Gilligan's moral theory to the
lawyering realm. As a number of critics have pointed out, the Portia who
makes the eloquent mercy speech in The Merchant of Venice when dis-
guised as a man is also the character most insistent on pushing the letter
of the law to its limits against Shylock 1 16 Portia makes a fine speech
about mercy, but when it comes down to brass tacks in representing her
"client," she is every bit as-indeed, more-willing to exploit legal tech-
nicalities and reject compromise solutions than any of her male compa-
triots. 117
1l5 An excellent critical discussion of Gilligan's work from a variety of interdisciplinary
perspectives, raising issues concerning Gilligan's lack of historical perspective and failure
to appreciate cultural variability, can be found in Linda K. Kerber et al., On In a Different
Voice: An Interdisciplinary Forum, 11 SIGNS 304 (1986).
116 See, e.g., Jane Maslow Cohen, Feminism and Adaptive Heroinism: The Paradigm of
Portia as a Means of Introduction, 25 TULSA L.J. 657, 725-34 (1990) (urging feminists to
cease viewing Portia as embodiment of "mercy" figure); Alice N. Benston, Portia, the Law,
and the Tripartite Structure of The Merchant of Venice, in THE MERCHANT OF VENICE:
CRITICAL ESSAYS 163, 172-80 (Thomas Wheeler ed., 199 1) (arguing that Portia personifies
"law," not mercy). But cf. Menkel-Meadow, Portia II, supra note 4, at 97-106 (acknowl-
edging complexity of Portia's role but continuing to argue for use of Portia as symbol sup-
porting feminine "ethic of care" in lawyering); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERA-
TURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 108-9 & n.54 (1988) (accepting equation of Portia
with "feminine" equity dimensions of law).
"7 Carl G. Jung's theory of personality is interesting in this regard. Jung posits that all
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This, then, is another lesson to be drawn from a close, empirical study of
gender in the construction of lawyering norms: the attribution of certain
modes of acceptable behavior to men and to women in connection with gen-
der ideologies may have scant correlation with actual behavior. Even when
such social constraints make it hard for persons of a particular gender to act
in particular ways, gender ideology may not reliably correlate with gender-
differentiated goals. Women may be restricted in taking overt actions in ac-
cordance with certain goals, but may find other ways of trying to achieve
these ends (as Kelley did in keeping her hand in the legal work of the NCL
behind the scenes, while granting male figureheads public authority in this
realm). Here again, the concept of women's agency is an important one to
bring to bear on the analysis. Women must operate within a socially con-
structed world of external (and internalized) constraints, but the existence of
such constraints has a complex and variable relationship to observed out-
comes, especially in contested situations. n8 Just as Kelley was in private
every bit the lawyer she did not claim to be in public, it may be that further
study of how gender operates in the social construction of lawyering roles
will yield discoveries far more complex, contradictory, and unpredictable
than we now can anticipate.
CONCLUSION
This Review Essay has called on feminist scholars within the legal acad-
emy to leave behind strong positions that either insist on theorizing generally
about the relationship between gender and lawyering roles or dismiss such
inquiries out of hand. In place of these approaches, I have argued for an his-
torical and context-sensitive exploration that would import new insights by
feminist scholars working within the disciplines of history, anthropology,
and other interpretative social sciences. Scholars such as Kathryn Kish Sklar
have shown how a fine-grained empirical approach to the study of gender,
open to complexity, contradiction, and surprise, can yield enormous insights
in advancing our understanding of how gender operates in the construction
of social institutions, including lawyering roles.
human personalities contain both masculine and feminine aspects (the "animus" and "an-
ima," respectively), but that the side of this duality opposite to one's manifest gender is
largely repressed into the unconsciousness, where it can emerge in shadowy but powerful
ways, as when men dream of mysterious women (their anima) or seemingly "feminine"
women commit acts of great violence. See C.G. JUNG, ASPECTS OF THE FEMININE (R.F.C.
Hull trans., 1982); C.G. JUNG, ASPECTS OF THE MASCULINE (R.F.C. Hull trans., 1989); see
also ANTHONY STORR, C.G. JUNG 23-72 (1973) (discussing Jung's theory of animus and
anima); GARETH S. HILL, MASCULINE AND FEMININE: THE NATURAL FLOW OF OPPOSITES
IN THE PSYCHE (1992) (same).
11 See, e.g., ORTNER, supra note 113, at 181, 194-212 (studying ways in which disrup-
tions caused by arrival of outsider trekkers in the Himalayas created conditions that al-
lowed Sherpa women certain opportunities to advance their status).

